ject, viz. some future
good.

Reply Obj. 2: These are called principal passions, in the order of
intention and completion. And though fear and hope are not the last
passions simply, yet they are the last of those passions that tend
towards something as future. Nor can the argument be pressed any
further except in the case of anger: yet neither can anger be
reckoned a principal passion, because it is an effect of daring,
which cannot be a principal passion, as we shall state further on
(Reply Obj. 3).

Reply Obj. 3: Despair implies movement away from good; and this is,
as it were, accidental: and daring implies movement towards evil;
and this too is accidental. Consequently these cannot be principal
passions; because that which is accidental cannot be said to be
principal. And so neither can anger be called a principal passion,
because it arises from daring.
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QUESTION 26

OF THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL IN PARTICULAR: AND FIRST, OF LOVE
(In Four Articles)

We have now to consider the soul's passions in particular, and (1)
the passions of the concupiscible faculty; (2) the passions of the
irascible faculty.

The first of these considerations will be threefold: since we shall
consider (1) Love and hatred; (2) Desire and aversion; (3) Pleasure
and sadness.

Concerning love, three points must be considered: (1) Love itself;
(2) The cause of love; (3) The effects of love. Under the first
head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether love is in the concupiscible power?

(2) Whether love is a passion?

(3) Whether love is the same as dilection?

(4) Whether love is properly divided into love of friendship, and
love of concupiscence?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 26, Art. 1]

Whether Love Is in the Concupiscible Power?

Objection 1: It would seem that love is not in the concupiscible
power. For it is written (Wis. 8:2): "Her," namely wisdom, "have I
loved, and have sought her out from my youth." But the concupiscible
power, being a part of the sensitive appetite, cannot tend to wisdom,
which is not apprehended by the senses. Therefore love is not in the
concupiscible power.

Obj. 2: Further, love seems to be identified with every passion: for
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7): "Love, yearning for the object
beloved, is desire; having and enjoying it, is joy; fleeing what is
contrary to it, is fear; and feeling what is contrary to it, is
sadness." But not e