e?
Objection 1: It would seem that love is not properly divided into
love of friendship and love of concupiscence. For "love is a passion,
while friendship is a habit," according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
viii, 5). But habit cannot be the member of a division of passions.
Therefore love is not properly divided into love of concupiscence and
love of friendship.
Obj. 2: Further, a thing cannot be divided by another member of the
same division; for man is not a member of the same division as
"animal." But concupiscence is a member of the same division as love,
as a passion distinct from love. Therefore concupiscence is not a
division of love.
Obj. 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3)
friendship is threefold, that which is founded on _usefulness,_ that
which is founded on _pleasure,_ and that which is founded on
_goodness._ But useful and pleasant friendship are not without
concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence should not be contrasted with
friendship.
_On the contrary,_ We are said to love certain things, because we
desire them: thus "a man is said to love wine, on account of its
sweetness which he desires"; as stated in _Topic._ ii, 3. But we have
no friendship for wine and suchlike things, as stated in _Ethic._
viii, 2. Therefore love of concupiscence is distinct from love of
friendship.
_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4), "to love is
to wish good to someone." Hence the movement of love has a twofold
tendency: towards the good which a man wishes to someone (to himself
or to another) and towards that to which he wishes some good.
Accordingly, man has love of concupiscence towards the good that he
wishes to another, and love of friendship towards him to whom he
wishes good.
Now the members of this division are related as primary and
secondary: since that which is loved with the love of friendship is
loved simply and for itself; whereas that which is loved with the
love of concupiscence, is loved, not simply and for itself, but for
something else. For just as that which has existence, is a being
simply, while that which exists in another is a relative being; so,
because good is convertible with being, the good, which itself has
goodness, is good simply; but that which is another's good, is a
relative good. Consequently the love with which a thing is loved,
that it may have some good, is love simply; while the love, with
which a thing is loved, that it may be another
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