tally in the passions of the appetite,
but essentially.

Reply Obj. 2: Passions having a tendency to good, are themselves
good, if they tend to that which is truly good, and in like manner,
if they turn away from that which is truly evil. On the other hand,
those passions which consist in aversion from good, and a tendency to
evil, are themselves evil.

Reply Obj. 3: In irrational animals the sensitive appetite does not
obey reason. Nevertheless, in so far as they are led by a kind of
estimative power, which is subject to a higher, i.e. the Divine
reason, there is a certain likeness of moral good in them, in regard
to the soul's passions.
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QUESTION 25

OF THE ORDER OF THE PASSIONS TO ONE ANOTHER
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the order of the passions to one another: and
under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) The relation of the irascible passions to the concupiscible
passions;

(2) The relation of the concupiscible passions to one another;

(3) The relation of the irascible passions to one another;

(4) The four principal passions.
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 25, Art. 1]

Whether the Irascible Passions Precede the Concupiscible Passions, or
Vice Versa?

Objection 1: It would seem that the irascible passions precede the
concupiscible passions. For the order of the passions is that of
their objects. But the object of the irascible faculty is the
difficult good, which seems to be the highest good. Therefore the
irascible passions seem to precede the concupiscible passions.

Obj. 2: Further, the mover precedes that which is moved. But the
irascible faculty is compared to the concupiscible, as mover to that
which is moved: since it is given to animals, for the purpose of
removing the obstacles that hinder the concupiscible faculty from
enjoying its object, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1, ad 1; I, Q. 81,
A. 2). Now "that which removes an obstacle, is a kind of mover"
(Phys. viii, 4). Therefore the irascible passions precede the
concupiscible passions.

Obj. 3: Further, joy and sadness are concupiscible passions. But joy
and sadness succeed to the irascible passions: for the Philosopher
says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "retaliation causes anger to cease, because
it produces pleasure instead of the previous pain." Therefore the
concupiscible passions follow the irascible passions.

_On the contrary,_ The concupiscible passions regard the abso