f the soul, passion is found
less than in the other powers.

Reply Obj. 2: The appetitive power is said to be more active, because
it is, more than the apprehensive power, the principle of the
exterior action: and this for the same reason that it is more
passive, namely, its being related to things as existing in
themselves: since it is through the external action that we come into
contact with things.

Reply Obj. 3: As stated in the First Part (Q. 78, A. 3) the organs of
the soul can be changed in two ways. First, by a spiritual change, in
respect of which the organ receives an "intention" of the object. And
this is essential to the act of the sensitive apprehension: thus is
the eye changed by the object visible, not by being colored, but by
receiving an intention of color. But the organs are receptive of
another and natural change, which affects their natural disposition;
for instance, when they become hot or cold, or undergo some similar
change. And whereas this kind of change is accidental to the act of
the sensitive apprehension; for instance, if the eye be wearied
through gazing intently at something or be overcome by the intensity
of the object: on the other hand, it is essential to the act of the
sensitive appetite; wherefore the material element in the definitions
of the movements of the appetitive part, is the natural change of the
organ; for instance, "anger is" said to be "a kindling of the blood
about the heart." Hence it is evident that the notion of passion is
more consistent with the act of the sensitive appetite, than with
that of the sensitive apprehension, although both are actions of a
corporeal organ.
________________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 22, Art. 3]

Whether Passion Is in the Sensitive Appetite Rather Than in the
Intellectual Appetite, Which Is Called the Will?

Objection 1: It would seem that passion is not more in the sensitive
than in the intellectual appetite. For Dionysius declares (Div. Nom.
ii) Hierotheus "to be taught by a kind of yet more Godlike
instruction; not only by learning Divine things, but also by
suffering (_patiens_) them." But the sensitive appetite cannot "suffer"
Divine things, since its object is the sensible good. Therefore
passion is in the intellectual appetite, just as it is also in the
sensitive appetite.

Obj. 2: Further, the more powerful the active force, the more intense
the passion. But the object of the intellectual appetite, which is
the uni