tite's repose in the good obtained; which
repose belongs to joy, which is a passion of the concupiscible
faculty.
Accordingly no movement of the soul can be contrary to the movement
of anger, and nothing else than cessation from its movement is
contrary thereto; thus the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "calm
is contrary to anger," by opposition not of contrariety but of
negation or privation.
From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 23, Art. 4]
Whether in the Same Power, There Are Any Passions, Specifically
Different, but Not Contrary to One Another?
Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be, in the same power,
specifically different passions that are not contrary to one another.
For the passions of the soul differ according to their objects. Now
the objects of the soul's passions are good and evil; and on this
distinction is based the contrariety of the passions. Therefore no
passions of the same power, that are not contrary to one another,
differ specifically.
Obj. 2: Further, difference of species implies a difference of form.
But every difference of form is in respect of some contrariety, as
stated in _Metaph._ x, 8. Therefore passions of the same power, that
are not contrary to one another, do not differ specifically.
Obj. 3: Further, since every passion of the soul consists in approach
or withdrawal in respect of good or evil, it seems that every
difference in the passions of the soul must needs arise from the
difference of good and evil; or from the difference of approach and
withdrawal; or from degrees in approach or withdrawal. Now the first
two differences cause contrariety in the passions of the soul, as
stated above (A. 2): whereas the third difference does not diversify
the species; else the species of the soul's passions would be
infinite. Therefore it is not possible for passions of the same power
to differ in species, without being contrary to one another.
_On the contrary,_ Love and joy differ in species, and are in the
concupiscible power; and yet they are not contrary to one another;
rather, in fact, one causes the other. Therefore in the same power
there are passions that differ in species without being contrary to
one another.
_I answer that,_ Passions differ in accordance with their active
causes, which, in the case of the passions of the soul, are their
objects. Now, the difference in active
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