ves rise to the passion
of _anger._

Accordingly it is clear that in the concupiscible faculty there are
three couples of passions; viz. love and hatred, desire and aversion,
joy and sadness. In like manner there are three groups in the
irascible faculty; viz. hope and despair, fear and daring, and anger
which has no contrary passion.

Consequently there are altogether eleven passions differing
specifically; six in the concupiscible faculty, and five in the
irascible; and under these all the passions of the soul are contained.

From this the replies to the objections are evident.
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QUESTION 24

OF GOOD AND EVIL IN THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider good and evil in the passions of the soul: and
under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the
soul?

(2) Whether every passion of the soul is morally evil?

(3) Whether every passion increases or decreases the goodness or
malice of an act?

(4) Whether any passion is good or evil specifically?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 24, Art. 1]

Whether Moral Good and Evil Can Be Found in the Passions of the Soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that no passion of the soul is morally
good or evil. For moral good and evil are proper to man: since
"morals are properly predicated of man," as Ambrose says (Super Luc.
Prolog.). But passions are not proper to man, for he has them in
common with other animals. Therefore no passion of the soul is
morally good or evil.

Obj. 2: Further, the good or evil of man consists in "being in
accord, or in disaccord with reason," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
iv). Now the passions of the soul are not in the reason, but in the
sensitive appetite, as stated above (Q. 22, A. 3). Therefore they
have no connection with human, i.e. moral, good or evil.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that "we are
neither praised nor blamed for our passions." But we are praised and
blamed for moral good and evil. Therefore the passions are not
morally good or evil.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) while speaking
of the passions of the soul: "They are evil if our love is evil; good
if our love is good."

_I answer that,_ We may consider the passions of the soul in two
ways: first, in themselves; secondly, as being subject to the command
of the reason and will. If then th