o
deviate always from the order of natural reason.

Reply Obj. 3: The passions of the soul, in so far as they are
contrary to the order of reason, incline us to sin: but in so far as
they are controlled by reason, they pertain to virtue.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 24, Art. 3]

Whether Passion Increases or Decreases the Goodness or Malice of an
Act?

Objection 1: It would seem that every passion decreases the goodness
of a moral action. For anything that hinders the judgment of reason,
on which depends the goodness of a moral act, consequently decreases
the goodness of the moral act. But every passion hinders the judgment
of reason: for Sallust says (Catilin.): "All those that take counsel
about matters of doubt, should be free from hatred, anger, friendship
and pity." Therefore passion decreases the goodness of a moral act.

Obj. 2: Further, the more a man's action is like to God, the better
it is: hence the Apostle says (Eph. 5:1): "Be ye followers of God, as
most dear children." But "God and the holy angels feel no anger when
they punish . . . no fellow-feeling with misery when they relieve the
unhappy," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5). Therefore it is
better to do such like deeds without than with a passion of the soul.

Obj. 3: Further, just as moral evil depends on its relation to
reason, so also does moral good. But moral evil is lessened by
passion: for he sins less, who sins from passion, than he who sins
deliberately. Therefore he does a better deed, who does well without
passion, than he who does with passion.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "the
passion of pity is obedient to reason, when pity is bestowed without
violating right, as when the poor are relieved, or the penitent
forgiven." But nothing that is obedient to reason lessens the moral
good. Therefore a passion of the soul does not lessen moral good.

_I answer that,_ As the Stoics held that every passion of the soul is
evil, they consequently held that every passion of the soul lessens
the goodness of an act; since the admixture of evil either destroys
good altogether, or makes it to be less good. And this is true
indeed, if by passions we understand none but the inordinate
movements of the sensitive appetite, considered as disturbances or
ailments. But if we give the name of passions to all the movements of
the sensitive appetite, then it belongs to the perfection of man's
good that