e passions be considered in
themselves, to wit, as movements of the irrational appetite, thus
there is no moral good or evil in them, since this depends on the
reason, as stated above (Q. 18, A. 5). If, however, they be
considered as subject to the command of the reason and will, then
moral good and evil are in them. Because the sensitive appetite is
nearer than the outward members to the reason and will; and yet the
movements and actions of the outward members are morally good or
evil, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Much more, therefore, may the
passions, in so far as they are voluntary, be called morally good or
evil. And they are said to be voluntary, either from being commanded
by the will, or from not being checked by the will.
Reply Obj. 1: These passions, considered in themselves, are common to
man and other animals: but, as commanded by the reason, they are
proper to man.
Reply Obj. 2: Even the lower appetitive powers are called rational,
in so far as "they partake of reason in some sort" (Ethic. i, 13).
Reply Obj. 3: The Philosopher says that we are neither praised nor
blamed for our passions considered absolutely; but he does not
exclude their becoming worthy of praise or blame, in so far as they
are subordinate to reason. Hence he continues: "For the man who fears
or is angry, is not praised . . . or blamed, but the man who is angry
in a certain way, i.e. according to, or against reason."
________________________
SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 24, Art. 2]
Whether Every Passion of the Soul Is Evil Morally?
Objection 1: It would seem that all the passions of the soul are
morally evil. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) that "some call
the soul's passions diseases or disturbances of the soul" [*Cf. Q.
22, A. 2, footnote]. But every disease or disturbance of the soul is
morally evil. Therefore every passion of the soul is evil morally.
Obj. 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "movement
in accord with nature is an action, but movement contrary to nature
is passion." But in movements of the soul, what is against nature is
sinful and morally evil: hence he says elsewhere (De Fide Orth. ii,
4) that "the devil turned from that which is in accord with nature to
that which is against nature." Therefore these passions are morally
evil.
Obj. 3: Further, whatever leads to sin, has an aspect of evil. But
these passions lead to sin: wherefore they are called "the passions
of sins" (Rom. 7
|