Greek more accurately, call them
passions." From this it is evident that the passions of the soul are
the same as affections. But affections manifestly belong to the
appetitive, and not to the apprehensive part. Therefore the passions
are in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part.
_I answer that,_ As we have already stated (A. 1) the word "passion"
implies that the patient is drawn to that which belongs to the agent.
Now the soul is drawn to a thing by the appetitive power rather than
by the apprehensive power: because the soul has, through its
appetitive power, an order to things as they are in themselves: hence
the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, 4) that "good and evil," i.e. the
objects of the appetitive power, "are in things themselves." On the
other hand the apprehensive power is not drawn to a thing, as it is
in itself; but knows it by reason of an "intention" of the thing,
which "intention" it has in itself, or receives in its own way. Hence
we find it stated (Metaph. vi, 4) that "the true and the false,"
which pertain to knowledge, "are not in things, but in the mind."
Consequently it is evident that the nature of passion is consistent
with the appetitive, rather than with the apprehensive part.
Reply Obj. 1: In things relating to perfection the case is the
opposite, in comparison to things that pertain to defect. Because in
things relating to perfection, intensity is in proportion to the
approach to one first principle; to which the nearer a thing
approaches, the more intense it is. Thus the intensity of a thing
possessed of light depends on its approach to something endowed with
light in a supreme degree, to which the nearer a thing approaches the
more light it possesses. But in things that relate to defect,
intensity depends, not on approach to something supreme, but [o]n
receding from that which is perfect; because therein consists the
very notion of privation and defect. Wherefore the less a thing
recedes from that which stands first, the less intense it is: and the
result is that at first we always find some small defect, which
afterwards increases as it goes on. Now passion pertains to defect,
because it belongs to a thing according as it is in potentiality.
Wherefore in those things that approach to the Supreme Perfection,
i.e. to God, there is but little potentiality and passion: while in
other things, consequently, there is more. Hence also, in the
supreme, i.e. the apprehensive, power o
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