or evil,
which the external action derives from its relation to the end, is to
be found first of all in the act of the will, whence it passes to the
external action. On the other hand, the goodness or malice which the
external action has of itself, on account of its being about due
matter and its being attended by due circumstances, is not derived
from the will, but rather from the reason. Consequently, if we
consider the goodness of the external action, in so far as it comes
from reason's ordination and apprehension, it is prior to the
goodness of the act of the will: but if we consider it in so far as
it is in the execution of the action done, it is subsequent to the
goodness of the will, which is its principle.

Reply Obj. 1: The exterior action is the object of the will, inasmuch
as it is proposed to the will by the reason, as good apprehended and
ordained by the reason: and thus it is prior to the good in the act
of the will. But inasmuch as it is found in the execution of the
action, it is an effect of the will, and is subsequent to the will.

Reply Obj. 2: The end precedes in the order of intention, but follows
in the order of execution.

Reply Obj. 3: A form as received into matter, is subsequent to matter
in the order of generation, although it precedes it in the order of
nature: but inasmuch as it is in the active cause, it precedes in
every way. Now the will is compared to the exterior action, as its
efficient cause. Wherefore the goodness of the act of the will, as
existing in the active cause, is the form of the exterior action.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 20, Art. 2]

Whether the Whole Goodness and Malice of the External Action Depends
on the Goodness of the Will?

Objection 1: It would seem that the whole goodness and malice of the
external action depend on the goodness of the will. For it is written
(Matt. 7:18): "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can
an evil tree bring forth good fruit." But, according to the gloss,
the tree signifies the will, and fruit signifies works. Therefore, it
is impossible for the interior act of the will to be good, and the
external action evil, or vice versa.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that there is no sin
without the will. If therefore there is no sin in the will, there
will be none in the external action. And so the whole goodness or
malice of the external action depends on the will.

Obj. 3: Further,