sive or appetitive power of the soul; whereas the principle
of the external action is the power that accomplishes the movement.
Now where the principles of action are different, the actions
themselves are different. Moreover, it is the action which is the
subject of goodness or malice: and the same accident cannot be in
different subjects. Therefore the goodness of the interior act cannot
be the same as that of the external action.
Obj. 2: Further, "A virtue makes that, which has it, good, and
renders its action good also" (Ethic. ii, 6). But the intellective
virtue in the commanding power is distinct from the moral virtue in
the power commanded, as is declared in _Ethic._ i, 13. Therefore the
goodness of the interior act, which belongs to the commanding power,
is distinct from the goodness of the external action, which belongs
to the power commanded.
Obj. 3: Further, the same thing cannot be cause and effect; since
nothing is its own cause. But the goodness of the interior act is the
cause of the goodness of the external action, or vice versa, as
stated above (AA. 1, 2). Therefore it is not the same goodness in
each.
_On the contrary,_ It was shown above (Q. 18, A. 6) that the act of
the will is the form, as it were, of the external action. Now that
which results from the material and formal element is one thing.
Therefore there is but one goodness of the internal and external act.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 17, A. 4), the interior act of
the will, and the external action, considered morally, are one act.
Now it happens sometimes that one and the same individual act has
several aspects of goodness or malice, and sometimes that it has but
one. Hence we must say that sometimes the goodness or malice of the
interior act is the same as that of the external action, and
sometimes not. For as we have already said (AA. 1, 2), these two
goodnesses or malices, of the internal and external acts, are
ordained to one another. Now it may happen, in things that are
subordinate to something else, that a thing is good merely from being
subordinate; thus a bitter draught is good merely because it procures
health. Wherefore there are not two goodnesses, one the goodness of
health, and the other the goodness of the draught; but one and the
same. On the other hand it happens sometimes that that which is
subordinate to something else, has some aspect of goodness in itself,
besides the fact of its being subordinate to some
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