inful, in So Far As It Is Good or
Evil?

Objection 1: It seems that a human action is not right or sinful, in
so far as it is good or evil. For "monsters are the sins of nature"
(Phys. ii, 8). But monsters are not actions, but things engendered
outside the order of nature. Now things that are produced according
to art and reason imitate those that are produced according to nature
(Phys. ii, 8). Therefore an action is not sinful by reason of its
being inordinate and evil.

Obj. 2: Further, sin, as stated in _Phys._ ii, 8 occurs in nature and
art, when the end intended by nature or art is not attained. But the
goodness or malice of a human action depends, before all, on the
intention of the end, and on its achievement. Therefore it seems that
the malice of an action does not make it sinful.

Obj. 3: Further, if the malice of an action makes it sinful, it
follows that wherever there is evil, there is sin. But this is false:
since punishment is not a sin, although it is an evil. Therefore an
action is not sinful by reason of its being evil.

_On the contrary,_ As shown above (Q. 19, A. 4), the goodness of a
human action depends principally on the Eternal Law: and consequently
its malice consists in its being in disaccord with the Eternal Law.
But this is the very nature of sin; for Augustine says (Contra Faust.
xxii, 27) that "sin is a word, deed, or desire, in opposition to the
Eternal Law." Therefore a human action is sinful by reason of its
being evil.

_I answer that,_ Evil is more comprehensive than sin, as also is good
than right. For every privation of good, in whatever subject, is an
evil: whereas sin consists properly in an action done for a certain
end, and lacking due order to that end. Now the due order to an end
is measured by some rule. In things that act according to nature,
this rule is the natural force that inclines them to that end. When
therefore an action proceeds from a natural force, in accord with the
natural inclination to an end, then the action is said to be right:
since the mean does not exceed its limits, viz. the action does not
swerve from the order of its active principle to the end. But when an
action strays from this rectitude, it comes under the notion of sin.

Now in those things that are done by the will, the proximate rule is
the human reason, while the supreme rule is the Eternal Law. When,
therefore, a human action tends to the end, according to the order of
reason and of the