a bad thing, just as he lists. Therefore it seems that
neither is there any reason for blaming a moral action, in the fact
that it is evil.

Obj. 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil is "weak and
incapable." But weakness or inability either takes away or diminishes
guilt. Therefore a human action does not incur guilt from being evil.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Virt. et Vit. i) that
"virtuous deeds deserve praise, while deeds that are opposed to
virtue deserve censure and blame." But good actions are virtuous;
because "virtue makes that which has it, good, and makes its action
good" (Ethic. ii, 6): wherefore actions opposed to virtue are evil.
Therefore a human action deserves praise or blame, through being good
or evil.

_I answer that,_ Just as evil is more comprehensive than sin, so is
sin more comprehensive than blame. For an action is said to deserve
praise or blame, from its being imputed to the agent: since to praise
or to blame means nothing else than to impute to someone the malice
or goodness of his action. Now an action is imputed to an agent, when
it is in his power, so that he has dominion over it: because it is
through his will that man has dominion over his actions, as was made
clear above (Q. 1, AA. 1, 2). Hence it follows that good or evil, in
voluntary actions alone, renders them worthy of praise or blame: and
in such like actions, evil, sin and guilt are one and the same thing.

Reply Obj. 1: Natural actions are not in the power of the natural
agent: since the action of nature is determinate. And, therefore,
although there be sin in natural actions, there is no blame.

Reply Obj. 2: Reason stands in different relations to the productions
of art, and to moral actions. In matters of art, reason is directed
to a particular end, which is something devised by reason: whereas in
moral matters, it is directed to the general end of all human life.
Now a particular end is subordinate to the general end. Since
therefore sin is a departure from the order to the end, as stated
above (A. 1), sin may occur in two ways, in a production of art.
First, by a departure from the particular end intended by the artist:
and this sin will be proper to the art; for instance, if an artist
produce a bad thing, while intending to produce something good; or
produce something good, while intending to produce something bad.
Secondly, by a departure from the general end of human life: and then