he will be said to sin, if he intend to produce a bad work, and does
so in effect, so that another is taken in thereby. But this sin is
not proper to the artist as such, but as man. Consequently for the
former sin the artist is blamed as an artist; while for the latter he
is blamed as a man. On the other hand, in moral matters, where we
take into consideration the order of reason to the general end of
human life, sin and evil are always due to a departure from the order
of reason to the general end of human life. Wherefore man is blamed
for such a sin, both as man and as a moral being. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "in art, he who sins voluntarily
is preferable; but in prudence, as in the moral virtues," which
prudence directs, "he is the reverse."
Reply Obj. 3: Weakness that occurs in voluntary evils, is subject to
man's power: wherefore it neither takes away nor diminishes guilt.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 21, Art. 3]
Whether a Human Action Is Meritorious or Demeritorious in So Far As
It Is Good or Evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that a human action is not meritorious or
demeritorious on account of its goodness or malice. For we speak of
merit or demerit in relation to retribution, which has no place save
in matters relating to another person. But good or evil actions are
not all related to another person, for some are related to the person
of the agent. Therefore not every good or evil human action is
meritorious or demeritorious.
Obj. 2: Further, no one deserves punishment or reward for doing as he
chooses with that of which he is master: thus if a man destroys what
belongs to him, he is not punished, as if he had destroyed what
belongs to another. But man is master of his own actions. Therefore a
man does not merit punishment or reward, through putting his action
to a good or evil purpose.
Obj. 3: Further, if a man acquire some good for himself, he does not
on that account deserve to be benefited by another man: and the same
applies to evil. Now a good action is itself a kind of good and
perfection of the agent: while an inordinate action is his evil.
Therefore a man does not merit or demerit, from the fact that he does
a good or an evil deed.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 3:10, 11): "Say to the just
man that it is well; for he shall eat the fruit of his doings. Woe to
the wicked unto evil; for the reward of his hands shall be given him."
_I answer
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