other good: thus a
palatable medicine can be considered in the light of a pleasurable
good, besides being conducive to health.

We must therefore say that when the external action derives goodness
or malice from its relation to the end only, then there is but one
and the same goodness of the act of the will which of itself regards
the end, and of the external action, which regards the end through
the medium of the act of the will. But when the external action has
goodness or malice of itself, i.e. in regard to its matter and
circumstances, then the goodness of the external action is distinct
from the goodness of the will in regarding the end; yet so that the
goodness of the end passes into the external action, and the goodness
of the matter and circumstances passes into the act of the will, as
stated above (AA. 1, 2).

Reply Obj. 1: This argument proves that the internal and external
actions are different in the physical order: yet distinct as they are
in that respect, they combine to form one thing in the moral order,
as stated above (Q. 17, A. 4).

Reply Obj. 2: As stated in _Ethic._ vi, 12, a moral virtue is
ordained to the act of that virtue, which act is the end, as it were,
of that virtue; whereas prudence, which is in the reason, is ordained
to things directed to the end. For this reason various virtues are
necessary. But right reason in regard to the very end of a virtue has
no other goodness than the goodness of that virtue, in so far as the
goodness of the reason is participated in each virtue.

Reply Obj. 3: When a thing is derived by one thing from another, as
from a univocal efficient cause, then it is not the same in both:
thus when a hot thing heats, the heat of the heater is distinct from
the heat of the thing heated, although it be the same specifically.
But when a thing is derived from one thing from another, according to
analogy or proportion, then it is one and the same in both: thus the
healthiness which is in medicine or urine is derived from the
healthiness of the animal's body; nor is health as applied to urine
and medicine, distinct from health as applied to the body of an
animal, of which health medicine is the cause, and urine the sign. It
is in this way that the goodness of the external action is derived
from the goodness of the will, and vice versa; viz. according to the
order of one to the other.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 20, Art. 4]

Whether the External