t is of a nature to produce worse results. On
the other hand, if the consequences follow by accident and seldom,
then they do not increase the goodness or malice of the action:
because we do not judge of a thing according to that which belongs to
it by accident, but only according to that which belongs to it of
itself.
Reply Obj. 1: The virtue of a cause is measured by the effect that
flows from the nature of the cause, not by that which results by
accident.
Reply Obj. 2: The good actions done by the hearers, result from the
preacher's words, as an effect that flows from their very nature.
Hence they redound to the merit of the preacher: especially when such
is his intention.
Reply Obj. 3: The consequences for which that man is ordered to be
punished, both follow from the nature of the cause, and are supposed
to be foreseen. For this reason they are reckoned as punishable.
Reply Obj. 4: This argument would prove if irregularity were the
result of the fault. But it is not the result of the fault, but of
the fact, and of the obstacle to the reception of a sacrament.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 20, Art. 6]
Whether One and the Same External Action Can Be Both Good and Evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that one and the same external action can
be both good and evil. For "movement, if continuous, is one and the
same" (Phys. v, 4). But one continuous movement can be both good and
bad: for instance, a man may go to church continuously, intending at
first vainglory, and afterwards the service of God. Therefore one and
the same action can be both good and bad.
Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, 3), action
and passion are one act. But the passion may be good, as Christ's
was; and the action evil, as that of the Jews. Therefore one and the
same act can be both good and evil.
Obj. 3: Further, since a servant is an instrument, as it were, of his
master, the servant's action is his master's, just as the action of a
tool is the workman's action. But it may happen that the servant's
action result from his master's good will, and is therefore good: and
from the evil will of the servant, and is therefore evil. Therefore
the same action can be both good and evil.
_On the contrary,_ The same thing cannot be the subject of
contraries. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore the same
action cannot be both good and evil.
_On the contrary,_ The same thing cannot be the sub
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