Action Adds Any Goodness or Malice to That of
the Interior Act?
Objection 1: It would seem that the external action does not add any
goodness or malice to that of the interior action. For Chrysostom
says (Hom. xix in Matt.): "It is the will that is rewarded for doing
good, or punished for doing evil." Now works are the witnesses of the
will. Therefore God seeks for works not on His own account, in order
to know how to judge; but for the sake of others, that all may
understand how just He is. But good or evil is to be estimated
according to God's judgment rather than according to the judgment of
man. Therefore the external action adds no goodness or malice to that
of the interior act.
Obj. 2: Further, the goodness and malice of the interior and external
acts are one and the same, as stated above (A. 3). But increase is
the addition of one thing to another. Therefore the external action
does not add to the goodness or malice of the interior act.
Obj. 3: Further, the entire goodness of created things does not add
to the Divine Goodness, because it is entirely derived therefrom. But
sometimes the entire goodness of the external action is derived from
the goodness of the interior act, and sometimes conversely, as stated
above (AA. 1, 2). Therefore neither of them adds to the goodness or
malice of the other.
_On the contrary,_ Every agent intends to attain good and avoid evil.
If therefore by the external action no further goodness or malice be
added, it is to no purpose that he who has a good or an evil will,
does a good deed or refrains from an evil deed. Which is unreasonable.
_I answer that,_ If we speak of the goodness which the external
action derives from the will tending to the end, then the external
action adds nothing to this goodness, unless it happens that the will
in itself is made better in good things, or worse in evil things.
This, seemingly, may happen in three ways. First in point of number;
if, for instance, a man wishes to do something with a good or an evil
end in view, and does not do it then, but afterwards wills and does
it, the act of his will is doubled and a double good, or a double
evil is the result. Secondly, in point of extension: when, for
instance, a man wishes to do something for a good or an evil end, and
is hindered by some obstacle, whereas another man perseveres in the
movement of the will until he accomplish it in deed; it is evident
that the will of the latter is more lasting
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