in good or evil, and in
this respect, is better or worse. Thirdly, in point of intensity: for
there are certain external actions, which, in so far as they are
pleasurable, or painful, are such as naturally to make the will more
intense or more remiss; and it is evident that the more intensely the
will tends to good or evil, the better or worse it is.
On the other hand, if we speak of the goodness which the external
action derives from its matter and due circumstances, thus it stands
in relation to the will as its term and end. And in this way it adds
to the goodness or malice of the will; because every inclination or
movement is perfected by attaining its end or reaching its term.
Wherefore the will is not perfect, unless it be such that, given the
opportunity, it realizes the operation. But if this prove impossible,
as long as the will is perfect, so as to realize the operation if it
could; the lack of perfection derived from the external action, is
simply involuntary. Now just as the involuntary deserves neither
punishment nor reward in the accomplishment of good or evil deeds, so
neither does it lessen reward or punishment, if a man through simple
involuntariness fail to do good or evil.
Reply Obj. 1: Chrysostom is speaking of the case where a man's will
is complete, and does not refrain from the deed save through the
impossibility of achievement.
Reply Obj. 2: This argument applies to that goodness which the
external action derives from the will as tending to the end. But
the goodness which the external action takes from its matter and
circumstances, is distinct from that which it derives from the end;
but it is not distinct from that which it has from the very act
willed, to which it stands in the relation of measure and cause,
as stated above (AA. 1, 2).
From this the reply to the Third Objection is evident.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 20, Art. 5]
Whether the Consequences of the External Action Increase Its Goodness
or Malice?
Objection 1: It would seem that the consequences of the external
action increase its goodness or malice. For the effect pre-exists
virtually in its cause. But the consequences result from the action
as an effect from its cause. Therefore they pre-exist virtually in
actions. Now a thing is judged to be good or bad according to its
virtue, since a virtue "makes that which has it to be good" (Ethic.
ii, 6). Therefore the consequences increase the goodness
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