one as it
is, without divesting it of its character of unity.

29. And because the objection (raised against our view) lies against his
(the opponent's) view likewise.

Those also who maintain that the world has sprung from the pradhana
implicitly teach that something not made up of parts, unlimited, devoid
of sound and other qualities--viz. the pradhana--is the cause of an
effect--viz. the world--which is made up of parts, is limited and is
characterised by the named qualities. Hence it follows from that
doctrine also either that the pradhana as not consisting of parts has to
undergo a change in its entirety, or else that the view of its not
consisting of parts has to be abandoned.--But--it might be pleaded in
favour of the Sa@nkhyas--they do not maintain their pradhana to be
without parts; for they define it as the state of equilibrium of the
three gu/n/as, Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, so that the pradhana
forms a whole containing the three gu/n/as as its parts.--We reply that
such a partiteness as is here proposed does not remove the objection in
hand because still each of the three qualities is declared to be in
itself without parts[306]. And each gu/n/a by itself assisted merely by
the two other gu/n/as constitutes the material cause of that part of the
world which resembles it in its nature[307].--So that the objection lies
against the Sa@nkhya view likewise.--Well, then, as the reasoning (on
which the doctrine of the impartiteness of the pradhana rests) is not
absolutely safe, let us assume that the pradhana consists of parts.--If
you do that, we reply, it follows that the pradhana cannot be eternal,
and so on.--Let it then be said that the various powers of the pradhana
to which the variety of its effects is pointing are its parts.--Well, we
reply, those various powers are admitted by us also who see the cause of
the world in Brahman.

The same objections lie against the doctrine of the world having
originated from atoms. For on that doctrine one atom when combining with
another must, as it is not made up of parts, enter into the combination
with its whole extent, and as thus no increase of bulk takes place we do
not get beyond the first atom.[308] If, on the other hand, you maintain
that the atom enters into the combination with a part only, you offend
against the assumption of the atoms having no parts.

As therefore all views are equally obnoxious to the objections raised,
the latter cannot be urged