hereas the sensitive
appetite tends only to the particular good, apprehended by the
sensitive power. Therefore the goodness of the will depends on
reason, in the same way as it depends on the object.
Reply Obj. 1: The good considered as such, i.e. as appetible,
pertains to the will before pertaining to the reason. But considered
as true it pertains to the reason, before, under the aspect of
goodness, pertaining to the will: because the will cannot desire a
good that is not previously apprehended by reason.
Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher speaks here of the practical intellect,
in so far as it counsels and reasons about the means: for in this
respect it is perfected by prudence. Now in regard to the means, the
rectitude of the reason depends on its conformity with the desire of
a due end: nevertheless the very desire of the due end presupposes on
the part of reason a right apprehension of the end.
Reply Obj. 3: The will moves the reason in one way: the reason moves
the will in another, viz. on the part of the object, as stated above
(Q. 9, A. 1).
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 19, Art. 4]
Whether the Goodness of the Will Depends on the Eternal Law?
Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the human will does
not depend on the eternal law. Because to one thing there is one rule
and one measure. But the rule of the human will, on which its
goodness depends, is right reason. Therefore the goodness of the will
does not depend on the eternal law.
Obj. 2: Further, "a measure is homogeneous with the thing measured"
(Metaph. x, 1). But the eternal law is not homogeneous with the human
will. Therefore the eternal law cannot be the measure on which the
goodness of the human will depends.
Obj. 3: Further, a measure should be most certain. But the eternal
law is unknown to us. Therefore it cannot be the measure on which the
goodness of our will depends.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 27) that "sin
is a deed, word or desire against the eternal law." But malice of the
will is the root of sin. Therefore, since malice is contrary to
goodness, the goodness of the will depends on the eternal law.
_I answer that,_ Wherever a number of causes are subordinate to one
another, the effect depends more on the first than on the second
cause: since the second cause acts only in virtue of the first. Now
it is from the eternal law, which is the Divine Reason, that human
reason i
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