de by reason: but then reason would not be entirely
erroneous. But when erring reason proposes something as being
commanded by God, then to scorn the dictate of reason is to scorn
the commandment of God.
Reply Obj. 3: Whenever reason apprehends something as evil, it
apprehends it under some species of evil; for instance, as being
something contrary to a divine precept, or as giving scandal, or for
some such like reason. And then that evil is reduced to that species
of malice.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 19, Art. 6]
Whether the Will Is Good When It Abides by Erring Reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is good when it abides by
erring reason. For just as the will, when at variance with the reason,
tends to that which reason judges to be evil; so, when in accord with
reason, it tends to what reason judges to be good. But the will is
evil when it is at variance with reason, even when erring. Therefore
even when it abides by erring reason, the will is good.
Obj. 2: Further, the will is always good, when it abides by the
commandment of God and the eternal law. But the eternal law and God's
commandment are proposed to us by the apprehension of the reason,
even when it errs. Therefore the will is good, even when it abides by
erring reason.
Obj. 3: Further, the will is evil when it is at variance with erring
reason. If, therefore, the will is evil also when it abides by erring
reason, it seems that the will is always evil when in conjunction
with erring reason: so that in such a case a man would be in a
dilemma, and, of necessity, would sin: which is unreasonable.
Therefore the will is good when it abides by erring reason.
_On the contrary,_ The will of those who slew the apostles was evil.
And yet it was in accord with the erring reason, according to John
16:2: "The hour cometh, that whosoever killeth you, will think that
he doth a service to God." Therefore the will can be evil, when it
abides by erring reason.
_I answer that,_ Whereas the previous question is the same as
inquiring "whether an erring conscience binds"; so this question is
the same as inquiring "whether an erring conscience excuses." Now
this question depends on what has been said above about ignorance.
For it was said (Q. 6, A. 8) that ignorance sometimes causes an act
to be involuntary, and sometimes not. And since moral good and evil
consist in action in so far as it is voluntary, as was stated above
(A. 2
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