fixed on something good: since to will to do something when it ought
not to be done, is not to will something good. Secondly, so that the
circumstance is referred to the act of willing. And thus, it is
impossible to will something good when one ought not to, because one
ought always to will what is good: except, perhaps, accidentally, in
so far as a man by willing some particular good, is prevented from
willing at the same time another good which he ought to will at that
time. And then evil results, not from his willing that particular
good, but from his not willing the other. The same applies to the
other circumstances.
Reply Obj. 3: Ignorance of circumstances excuses malice of the will,
in so far as the circumstance affects the thing willed: that is to
say, in so far as a man ignores the circumstances of the act which
he wills.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 19, Art. 3]
Whether the Goodness of the Will Depends on Reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the will does not
depend on reason. For what comes first does not depend on what
follows. But the good belongs to the will before it belongs to
reason, as is clear from what has been said above (Q. 9, A. 1).
Therefore the goodness of the will does not depend on reason.
Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that the
goodness of the practical intellect is "a truth that is in conformity
with right desire." But right desire is a good will. Therefore the
goodness of the practical reason depends on the goodness of the will,
rather than conversely.
Obj. 3: Further, the mover does not depend on that which is moved,
but vice versa. But the will moves the reason and the other powers,
as stated above (Q. 9, A. 1). Therefore the goodness of the will
does not depend on reason.
_On the contrary,_ Hilary says (De Trin. x): "It is an unruly will
that persists in its desires in opposition to reason." But the
goodness of the will consists in not being unruly. Therefore the
goodness of the will depends on its being subject to reason.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2), the goodness of the will
depends properly on the object. Now the will's object is proposed to
it by reason. Because the good understood is the proportionate object
of the will; while sensitive or imaginary good is proportionate not
to the will but to the sensitive appetite: since the will can tend to
the universal good, which reason apprehends; w
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