decided on in that unprecedented
case is well known.

SHERMAN'S "MARCH TO THE SEA"

When Sherman cut loose and started for Savannah on November 12, he
had not, as events proved, sufficient reason for assuming "Thomas's
strength and ability to meet Hood in the open field," or even to
hold Nashville against him, much less to hold "the line of the
Tennessee River firmly," which was the condition upon which Grant
at first consented that Sherman might make "the trip to the sea-
coast."( 1)

Thomas's concurrence in Sherman's opinion, as shown in his despatch
of November 12, simply shows that they were both in the same error;
for A. J. Smith's troops did not begin to arrive at Nashville until
the day of the battle of Franklin (November 30), and they were a
very important part of the force relied upon in Sherman's plan.
The whole fate of the Tennessee campaign was decided by the delay
of Hood at Columbia and Spring Hill and his defeat in the desperate
battle of Franklin, and this by two of Sherman's six corps, without
the aid of any of the reinforcements upon which he counted so
largely, and about which he says so much. It is not too much to
say that the hazards of that retreat from Pulaski and of the defense
at Franklin were far greater than any portion of Sherman's army
had ever before encountered, and far greater than any army ever
ought to meet except in case of necessity--hazards which, at that
stage of the war, with our vastly superior armies in the field, it
would have been inexcusable voluntarily to incur. If it is asked
why such hazard was taken, the answer has heretofore been given.
By it alone could the time be gained which was necessary for Thomas's
reinforcements to reach Nashville. The time gained was barely
sufficient; one day less might have been fatal.

The question that at once arises is, Why have taken even a chance
of error in a matter of so vital moment--an error that might have
led to disastrous consequences? Hood was already on the Tennessee
River, preparing to cross and begin his march to Nashville. Thomas
had ready to meet him only about two thirds Hood's strength in
infantry, and less than half in effective cavalry. A few days'
delay on Sherman's part in commencing his march would have disclosed
to him the impossibility of Smith's arrival in time, and have
enabled him to send another corps from his superabundant force to
assist Thomas. Such de