sed by crushing or capturing the
Confederate armies, or that our vastly superior military strength
must necessarily be employed in crushing the Southern people,
however much they might deserve crushing, or else that we must give
up the contest. Yet while I never saw the necessity for what
Sherman called "statesmanship" rather than "war," I would never
have hesitated for a moment to say, what I now repeat, if it really
was necessary, in order to put down the rebellion and restore the
Union, to destroy all the property in the South, in the name of a
just and beneficent God, destroy it all! Hence my objection to
Sherman's plans was based upon my conviction that such plans were
not at that time, and never had been, necessary. Yet such plans
are legitimate and often necessary, and no man is wise enough to
tell in advance whether they may prove to be necessary or not.
The surest way to reach results is the way Sherman adopted. In
either a civil or foreign war, such methods may be very bad policy;
but very few men are cool-headed enough in civil war, even if wise
enough, to see what good policy dictates, and this is even more
true of men at a distance than of those at the front. Men who have
been fighting most of the time for three or four years generally
become pretty cool, while those in the rear seem to become hotter
and hotter as the end approaches, and even for some time after it
is reached. They must in some way work off the surplus passion
which the soldier has already exhausted in battle. Whatever may
be true as to Sherman's methods before Lee surrendered, the
destruction inflicted on the South after that time was solely the
work of passion, and not of reason. Of this last Sherman was
innocent.

Sherman's destruction of military supplies and railroads did
undoubtedly render impossible any great prolongation of the war,
if that would otherwise have been possible; but it did not materially
hasten the actual collapse of the rebellion, which was due to
Grant's capture of Lee's army. Besides, if Grant had not captured
Lee, Sherman would. Lee could not possibly have escaped them both.
Hence Sherman's destruction of property in Georgia, South Carolina,
and North Carolina did not hasten the end of the rebellion. If
General Sherman was, at the time he planned his march to the sea,
informed of the nearly bankrupt condition of the United States
treasury, that fact went far toward justifying his action in leaving
as