eaving
open the road to Macon, as also to Augusta," as embodied in his
despatch to Halleck on September 25, related simply to the opportunity
thus offered to carry into effect without difficulty the original
plan of a change of base to Savannah. But when Hood's movement
had gone so far, and his designs were so fully disclosed, as
practically to eliminate his army from the problem in the Atlantic
States, Sherman determined to march as soon as possible, with the
ulterior purpose to "reinforce our armies in Virginia." He
telegraphed his determination to Grant on November 1, and on November
6 wrote him very fully, giving his reasons, including that to
reinforce Grant. Hence Sherman was well able to say at Savannah
on December 24: "I feel no doubt whatever as to our future plans.
I have thought them over so long and well that they appear clear
as daylight."

It should be observed that Sherman's letter of November 6 to Grant
was strictly confidential. "I have still some thoughts . . . that
should be confided to you [that is, to Grant and to nobody else]
as a key to future developments." Neither Grant nor Sherman appears
to have made any use of that "key" for the public benefit. But it
now unlocks the store-house of Sherman's mind, and shows to the
world more of the real character of the great strategist than any
other public document he ever wrote.

Then Grant was ready with his plan, first to seize and hold the
Southern railroads by which supplies could reach Lee, and second,
for Sherman and the most of his army to come to Virginia by sea,
to which Sherman responded with all the loyalty of his most loyal
nature, only mentioning incidentally his own plan. Thereupon, when
Grant gave him an invitation to speak freely, he replied as above
quoted, and explained in detail his plans for the northward march,
to "be on the Roanoke, either at Raleigh or Weldon, by the time
the spring fairly opens; and if you feel confident that you can
whip Lee outside of his intrenchments, I feel equally confident
that I can handle him in the open country."

But Sherman's "busy brain" had provided in advance even for the
worst possible contingency--that after all his long march, however
long it might prove to be, that march might have to "stand alone"
--he might not actually take part in the capture of either of the
Confederate armies. Hence, before starting on his march, in his
letter of November 6 to Grant he explained that his march