n regarded as the great exploit,
while the vastly more difficult and important march through the
Carolinas appears to have been taken as a matter of course, perhaps
because of the conviction, which had by that time become general,
that Sherman could do anything he might undertake.

In respect to Sherman's skill in grand tactics, I have only a few
words to say here. The part assigned him in Grant's general plan
of operations for all the armies, in 1864, in his "private and
confidential" letter of April 6, was as follows: "You I propose
to move against Johnston's army to break it up, and to get into
the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting
all the damage you can against their war resources." It is a
simple, plain matter of history that Sherman did not accomplish
the first and more important part of the task assigned him--"to
break it up"--in the four months of almost constant fighting with
Johnston's army. In the comments I have made upon the Atlanta
campaign, I believe I have shown clearly why Sherman did not
accomplish that result by the tactical operations to which he
limited himself. The manner in which that army, then under Hood
instead of Johnston, was finally broken up by Sherman's subordinates
in Tennessee, shows clearly enough what kind of modification of
Sherman's tactical methods was requisite to enable him to reach
the same result in Georgia.

SHERMAN'S GREAT ABILITY AS A STRATEGIST

Sherman's tactical operations during the entire Atlanta campaign
were marked by the highest degree of prudence and caution. Even
his one assault upon fortified lines at Kenesaw was no exception;
for the worst that could happen in that was what actually did
happen, namely, a fruitless loss of a considerable number of men,
yet a number quite insignificant in comparison with the total
strength of his army. Johnston displayed similar qualities in an
equal degree so long as he was in command; and his well-known
ability may have suggested to Sherman the wisdom of like prudence
in all his own operations. But Hood signalized his accession to
the command by the boldest kind of tactics, amounting even to
rashness in the commander of a force so inferior to that of his
adversary. Yet Sherman continued his own cautious methods to the
end. Even his last move, which resulted in the capture of Atlanta,
--the only one which had even the general appearance of boldness,
--wa