ground of the political
history of the Southern States during the twelve years from 1865
to 1877, and compared with the plans of political doctrinaires in
1865, under the light of experience and reason, the Sherman-Johnston
memorandum and Sherman's letters of that period seem self-luminous
with political wisdom. Sherman needed only the aid of competent
military advisers in whom he had confidence to have made him one
of the greatest generals of any age, and he would have needed only
the aid of competent political advisers to have made him a great
statesman. But he looked almost with contempt upon a "staff," and
would doubtless have thought little better of a "cabinet."

The efforts of political leaders to establish an absolutely impossible
popular government in the South seem to show the necessity of
general political education, no less than the military blunders of
the war show the necessity of general military education. If our
schools would drop from their course of studies some of the
comparatively unimportant "ologies," and substitute the qualifications
for good citizenship, the change would be greatly for the better.

General Sherman was one of those rare actors in historic events
who require no eulogy. All his important acts were so unqualifiedly
his own, and so emphatically speak for themselves, that it is only
necessary to judge of the quality and merits of those acts. There
is no question of division of honors between him and any other
respecting any of his important operations. It is not meant by
this that he was disdainful of the advice or opinions of others.
On the contrary, although naturally impulsive and self-reliant,
his acquired habit was to study carefully and consult freely with
his subordinate commanders respecting all important movements.
Yet discussion resulted almost if not quite invariably in the
adoption of his own original plans. As to details, he was wont to
leave them very much to his subordinates, and, I think, did not
estimate very accurately the possibilities or probabilities of the
accomplishment of the details necessary to the success of his
general plans. It is certainly not too much to say that his
expectations in this regard were very frequently unrealized. But
of this it must be observed that the character of the theater of
war made the handling of a large army extremely difficult, precision
of movement impossible, and any accurate estimate of the time in
which projected