ad not been present when Sherman's memorandum
was agreed upon, had not been consulted about in any way, and knew
nothing of its character until after it had been sent to Washington.
All of this Halleck could have learned at once if he had inquired,
which he did not. So far as I know, he left on record, without
any subsequent explanation or correction, a report which was without
the slightest foundation in fact, and which he understood to be
very damaging to my reputation. Hence it seems necessary for me
to record the fact that there was no foundation for that report.
Beyond this I will only say that I think General Halleck, in this
slight matter, as in his far more serious conduct toward General
Sherman, was inexcusably thoughtless respecting the damage he might
do to the reputation of a brother soldier. The least a true man
can do is to make suitable public reparation if he has for any
reason done publicly a personal injustice.

HALLECK'S ATTEMPT TO SUPPLANT GRANT

I knew personally at the time the exact truth respecting the action
of General Halleck toward General Grant before the battle of Shiloh,
especially in ordering Grant to remain in the rear while General
C. F. Smith was sent with the advance of the army to Pittsburg
Landing, as described by General Grant in his "Memoirs." Halleck
hoped Smith might fight a battle and win a victory in Grant's
absence, which would naturally be followed by an order putting
Smith in command in place of Grant. But Halleck had not anticipated
Grant's soldierly action in applying to be relieved, and was not
prepared to face that emergency. As soon as Grant's application
reached St. Louis, Halleck abandoned that line of action, but he
did not abandon his purpose to supersede Grant in some way until
some time later. Whatever excuse there may have been at that time
for Halleck's opinion of Grant, nothing can be said in favor of
the method he adopted to accomplish his purpose to supersede him.

The action of Grant in this case well foreshadowed that which
occurred when he was tendered the commission of lieutenant-general
and the command of all the armies. Grant would not hold any
commission or command without full authority to perform the duties
belonging to it. In his "Memoirs" he modestly refrains from relating
the most important part of that action, as he told it to me on the
war-steamer _Rhode Island_ the next January. Before accept