avor as it would in favor of any
living man, myself included."

To this Sherman replied, September 20: "In the meantime, know that
I admire your dogged perseverance and pluck more than ever."

There has been much learned discussion of the relative merits of
McClellan's, Grant's, and other plans for the "capture of Richmond,"
as if that was the object of the campaign. In fact, though the
capture of Richmond at any time during the war would have produced
some moral effect injurious to the rebellion and beneficial to the
Union in public opinion, it would have been a real injury to the
Union cause in a military sense, because it would have given us
one more important place to garrison, and have increased the length
of our line of supplies, always liable to be broken by the enemy's
cavalry.

The worst form of operations in such a war is "territorial" strategy,
or that which aims at the capture and occupation of territory as
a primary object. The best is that which aims at the destruction
or capture of the opposing armies as the first and only important
object. Grant at Donelson, Vicksburg, and in Virginia best
illustrated this kind of strategy.

HALLECK'S CHARACTERISTICS

Halleck was probably the chief of the "territorial" strategists of
our Civil War period. In the winter of 1861-1862 the counties of
north Missouri bordering on the Missouri River were infested with
guerrillas. Halleck sent Pope, with a force of all arms amounting
to a considerable army, to "clear them out." Pope marched in
triumph from one end of that tier of counties to the other, and
Halleck then informed me with evident satisfaction that north
Missouri was cleared of rebels, and that the war was ended in that
part of the State! In fact, the guerrillas, "flushed" like a flock
of quail by Pope's advance-guard, had taken to the bush until the
rear-guard had passed out of sight, and then were found "feeding"
again on their old ground.

I felt greatly complimented when Halleck, on his return from Corinth
to St. Louis, en route to Washington to take command of the army,
gave me a full explanation of his "siege of Corinth," including
his application of the standard European tactics of a former
generation, with its rule of 10,000 men to the mile in line and
regular approaches.

I was many years younger than Halleck, Thomas, Sherman, Grant, and
the other chief commanders, and hence had much more