retaining the dominant attitude of "master," Sherman lost it the
moment he started eastward with his main army, leaving an inferior
force to cope with his enemy; and the march through Georgia and
the capture of Savannah did not by any means restore that mastery
to Sherman. It was not restored until Hood was actually defeated
in Tennessee.

THE FAME OF SHERMAN'S GRAND MARCHES

I have referred to the possibilities of a direct march from Atlanta
via Columbia or Charlotte, with a much larger army, at exactly the
same time, for the purpose of showing that even Sherman's grand
strategic plan to assist in the capture of Lee's army did not
necessitate or justify his action in marching to Savannah and
quitting his own theater of operations before his adversary there
had been disposed of. The plan above suggested would have negatived
even more positively the boast and promise of the Confederate chief
that Sherman should be driven out of Georgia. The fact that Sherman
personally, with an army about as large as, or larger than, Hood's,
could and did remain quietly at Atlanta while one of his subordinates
disposed of Hood and his army, would have been the most emphatic
possible defeat of the Confederate plan to force him back by
operations in his rear. Only one part of Sherman's earnest desires
would have been unrealized--namely, to destroy Georgia. But even
that could have been, at least in a great measure, compensated for
by the more complete destruction of South Carolina, the cradle of
secession and rebellion.

The more carefully Sherman's great operations are examined, the
more clearly it will appear that while his plans were magnificent,
their execution was not perfect. And this is the legitimate aim
of just military criticism, not to build up or pull down the
reputations of commanders, but to assist military students in their
efforts to perfect themselves in the art and science of war.

Sherman's great marches, especially through the enemy's country
and over such obstacles as those found from Savannah to Goldsboro',
showed him to be a master of the auxiliary art of logistics no less
than of the great science of strategy. Even to those who have had
no means of duly appreciating the higher merits of Sherman's general
plans, his marches have seemed the wonder of the world. Yet,
strangely enough, the march through Georgia, which was in fact the
simplest thing possible, has bee