olitics of
the dominant part at that time would have known that it was at
least unwise to introduce political questions at all. Besides, he
had the example of his superior, the general-in-chief, who had just
accepted the surrender of the principal Confederate army from the
Confederate generalissimo without any political conditions; and
the knowledge of President Lincoln's assassination, which must have
made the country unwilling to consent to more liberal terms than
had before been granted. Yet, however unwise Sherman's action may
have been, the uproar it created, and the attacks upon his honor
and integrity for which it was made the excuse, were utterly
inexcusable. They were probably unexampled as an exhibition of
the effect of great and unusual excitement upon the minds of men
unaccustomed to such moral and mental strain.

The most charitable view of this matter seems also to be the most
just--namely, that the high officers of government were completely
unnerved and lost their heads under the terrible strain produced
by President Lincoln's assassination, increased somewhat, perhaps,
by a natural apprehension of what might come next. The contrast
between this state of excitement in Washington and the marked calm
that prevailed throughout the army was very instructive, and it
was difficult for any soldier to understand at that time the state
of mind in Washington. No part of the people could have felt more
deeply or with greater indignation the loss the country had suffered,
and the infamous crime by which it had been accomplished. Yet not
a ripple of excitement could be seen anywhere in the army. The
profound calm which pervades the atmosphere surrounding a great,
disciplined, self-confident army is one of the most sublime
exhibitions of human nature.

That Sherman felt "outraged beyond measure" was natural and indeed
inevitable. He had committed an error of judgment arising from
political inexperience and a failure to appreciate the difference
between Mr. Lincoln's humane purposes toward individual Confederates
and his political policy. But the error was of the least possible
practical consequence, and there was not the slightest excuse for
making it public at the time, in violation of all rules of official
courtesy. All that it was necessary or right to do was to tell
Sherman to correct his error.

While the effect of these ferocious bulletins received some time
later was such as General Sherman fully