8, 1865, announcing to all
the troops of his military division the results of his great
campaign, General Sherman said: "Generals Thomas and Schofield,
commanding the departments to our rear, returned to their posts
and prepared to decoy General Hood into their meshes." If the
purpose that prompted Sherman to send me back to Tennessee was to
serve as a "decoy" to Hood, I must say that my part of the sport
would have been more enjoyable if it had taken place earlier in
the season, when Sherman was near by with his sixty thousand men
to help "bag the game."

It has occurred to me as at least possible that Sherman's recollection
of the suggestions I had repeatedly made to him during the Atlanta
campaign may have been in his mind when he ordered me back to report
to Thomas, and when he wrote his special field order. If so, I
must protest my innocence of any intention to play the role of
"decoy" at Franklin when one of the great gunners was twenty miles
away, and the other several hundred!

Yet, accepting even the most unfavorable view of Sherman's tactical
as well as of his strategical operations in connection with the
operations of all the other armies under Grant's general plans and
direction, there was nothing in them all that could possibly have
prevented their complete ultimate success in the capture of Lee's
army. If Grant had not captured that army, Sherman would. And
the surrender of Lee was necessarily followed by that of all the
other Confederate armies. Hence, whatever might have happened if
Sherman's great march had not been made, that march with so large
an army made the end of the rebellion in the spring of 1865 sure
beyond any possible doubt. In view of a public service so original
in its conception, so grand in its magnitude, and so brilliant in
its execution, any criticism respecting details cannot diminish
the fame of the general who planned and executed that grand campaign,
nor that of the general-in-chief, the success of whose far-reaching
plans had made the brilliant exploit of his subordinate possible.
Such criticisms are justifiable only in the interest of exact truth
and of exact military science, so that imperfections in the operations
of the greatest commanders may not be mistaken by the military
student as having been among the causes which led to success.

[( 1) Sherman's "Memoirs," Vol. II, p. 141.]

[( 2) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part iii, p. 658.]

[( 3) War Records, Vol. XXXII,