Wilmington with little loss; then
we captured Kinston, after a pretty sharp fight of three days, and
occupied Goldsboro' on March 21, within one day of the time indicated
by Sherman, from Laurel Hill, N. C., March 8, for our junction at
Goldsboro'. General Sherman, who had been delayed by his battle
at Bentonville, did not reach Goldsboro' until the 23d, but the
sound of his guns on the 20th and 21st informed me that he was
near, and I put a bridge across the Neuse River, so as to go to
his assistance if necessary. After the junction at Goldsboro', I
commanded the "center," one of the three grand divisions of Sherman's
army.

For the elucidation of some things in this campaign which have
seemed obscure, and some acts of General Sherman which have been
severely criticized, it is necessary to know the ruling ideas which
actuated him. As Sherman says, in his own estimate of the relative
importance of his march through Georgia and that through the
Carolinas, the former was only a change of base preparatory to the
latter, the great final campaign of the war, which had for its end
the defeat and capture of Lee's army. Sherman and his army expected
to share the glory of capturing Richmond and Lee's army, which had
baffled the Eastern troops for four years. This feeling in the
army was very general and very manifest at the time.

SHERMAN'S PLAN OF MARCHING TO THE REAR OF LEE

After the concentration at Goldsboro', Sherman's plan was to march
straight for Lee's rear at Petersburg, and he expected Johnston to
keep ahead of him and to unite with Lee for the final struggle at
or near Richmond. Grant's idea was quite different: He wanted
Sherman to keep between Lee and Johnston and prevent their union,
as well as to cut off Lee's retreat if he should escape before
Grant was ready to move, the latter alleging that he had ample
force to take care of Lee as soon as the necessary preparations
were made and the roads would permit him to move. It was this
important difference of plan that occasioned Sherman's visit to
City Point, where he hoped to gain Grant's acquiescence in his own
plans. The result was the movement ordered by Sherman on his return
to Goldsboro', which was substantially the same as that which Grant
had before proposed. Grant's immediate army proved to be, as he
predicted it would, amply sufficient for the capture of the whole
of Lee's army. Hence it is difficult to see in wha