ore
Smith's arrival was 13,000 men less than Sherman had stated it.
So that the whole brunt of the fight with Hood fell upon the two
corps which Sherman had sent back, without any help from the
reinforcements upon which Sherman counted so largely. It was, in
fact, _six weeks_ instead of a "very few days" before Thomas was
able "to assume the offensive." It was not attempted to "hold the
line of the Tennessee" either "firmly" or at all.

Having been absent from the army in the field during Hood's raid
in Sherman's rear, I knew little personally about those estimates
of the strength of the opposing forces. For the same reason, I
knew nothing of Sherman's plans or correspondence with Grant which
were considered or took place after the fall of Atlanta, though I
had been perfectly familiar with the plans discussed previous to
that time having in view a change of base to some point on the
Atlantic or on the gulf, with a view to further operations in
Georgia or the Gulf States, wherever there might be a hostile army
to operate against. Yet when I met Sherman at Gaylesburg I was
surprised to learn that he was going off to the sea with five sixths
of his army, leaving Thomas, with only one of his six corps, and
no other veteran troops then ready for field service, to take care
of Hood until he could get A. J. Smith from Missouri, incorporate
new regiments into the army and make them fit to meet the veteran
enemy, remount his cavalry, and concentrate his garrisons and
railroad guards in Tennessee! Of course I knew far less than
Sherman did about all that, for I had no responsibility and little
knowledge about Thomas's department. But I knew enough to feel
astonished when Sherman told me what he proposed to do. I plainly
told Sherman so, and urged him to send me back with my corps to
join Stanley and help Thomas.(12)

Here arise several interesting questions which would be worthy of
consideration, although a satisfactory solution of them might not
be possible. Under Sherman's assurance as to what he had done for
Thomas in Tennessee, Grant appears to have been fully satisfied
that Thomas would be able to take care of Hood and destroy him,
thus eliminating that Confederate army from the future problem in
the Atlantic States. But could Sherman, with his more exact
knowledge of what he actually had done, have felt the same confidence?
In view of that knowledge and of the results of his own previous
operations against Hood