ng to say anything about the
fulfillment or nonfulfillment of that condition.

From about October 1 till the time Sherman started on his march--
six weeks--he seems to have been so intent on the execution of that
project, and upon doing it with as large an army as possible, that
no question of military principle or of fact could be permitted to
stand in his way. He assumed and maintained throughout that the
only question was whether he should continue the aggressive, or
allow the enemy's movements to put him on the defensive, refusing
to consider any other possible plan of aggressive operations, except
for a moment in response to advice from Grant, and then brushing
it aside as impracticable.--"If I could hope to overhaul Hood,"
etc. In like manner, he appears to have convinced himself that
his arrangements for direct operations against Hood by Thomas in
Tennessee were very materially more complete than they were in
fact, and he so represented the matter to General Grant. It seems
quite certain that Grant was laboring under a serious misapprehension
in respect to Thomas's condition to cope with Hood, and no doubt
Grant's subsequent impatience in respect to Thomas's action was
largely due to this fact. This point deserves close consideration.

GRANT'S FINAL JUDGMENT ON IT

Grant's first assent to Sherman's plan was made, October 11, on
the condition of "holding the line of the Tennessee firmly." On
October 22 Sherman telegraphed: "I am now perfecting arrangements
to put into Tennessee a force able to hold the line of the
Tennessee."

Even as late as November 1, Grant again suggested to Sherman that
Hood ought to be his "objective," now that he "has gone so far
north." At an earlier hour the same day, in the despatch above
quoted, Sherman telegraphed, "trusting that General Thomas . . .
will be able in a very few days to assume the offensive." To this
Grant replied November 2: "With the force, however, you have left
with Thomas, he must be able to take care of Hood and destroy him."
In that despatch of November 1 Sherman had made a statement of the
troops Thomas would have, including A. J. Smith's from Missouri,
adding, "but I doubt if they can reach Tennessee in less than ten
days." Now Smith's troops did not reach Tennessee in less than
_thirty_ days instead of ten days, and after the crisis of the
campaign was passed; and the effective force in Tennessee bef