nd letter, mentioning his very mature
consideration of his future plans and perfect confidence in respect
to them, he knew that Hood's army had been broken up, and had become
a small factor in the future problem. How long, and to what extent,
had Sherman anticipated these results in Tennessee, and matured
the plans of future operations, which were dependent upon those
results? I shall consider these several questions, which involve
so intimately the character of my old commander.

[( 1) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part iii, p. 202.]

[( 2) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part ii, pp. 364, 411.]

[( 3) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part iii, p. 594.]

[( 4) _ibid_., p. 576.]

[( 5) _Ibid_., p. 594.]

[( 6) Vol. II, p. 154.]

[( 7) Mr. Jefferson Davis's speech. See General Sherman's "Memoirs,"
Vol. II, p. 141.]

[( 8) See the Century War Book, "Battles and Leaders of the Civil
War," Vol. IV, p. 257.]

[( 9) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part iii, p. 658.]

[(10) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part iii, p. 202.]

[(11) Vol. II, pp. 374-6.]

[(12) See my letter to General Sherman, December 28, 1864, p. 254.]

CHAPTER XVII
Sherman's Purpose in Marching to the Sea--His Expectations that
the Change of Base Would Be "Statesmanship," If Not "War"--The
Thousand-Mile March of Hood's Men to Surrender to Sherman--The
Credit Given by Grant to Sherman--"Master of the Situation"--The
Fame of Sherman's Grand Marches--His Great Ability as a Strategist.

The actual result in Tennessee was more decisive than Sherman had
any good reason to expect. But he had good reason to expect, and
evidently did, that Thomas would be able, after he had concentrated
his troops, and after Hood had done considerable damage, to drive
the latter out of Tennessee and pursue him with such force and
energy as fully to occupy his attention and prevent him from
interfering in any manner with Sherman's own operations. Hence
Sherman as well as Grant had reason to assume that Hood's army
would be eliminated from the military problem in the Atlantic
States. Again, the general military situation as known to General
Sherman, or probably to anybody else, in October and November,
1864, did not indicate that Grant, with the force he then had in
Virginia, would be able to capture or destroy Lee's army. He might
undoubtedly capture Petersburg and Richmond, but Lee would probably
be able to withdraw his army toward the south, nearer to his sources
of supply, and by skilful