rary
triumph to the chief of the Confederate armies, who had loudly
proclaimed his purpose to drive Sherman out of Georgia, and protect
that State from any further invasion. Such a concession, however
temporary, was manifestly intolerable to Sherman's mind.( 1)
Besides, Sherman had formed and announced, with Grant's cordial
concurrence, a well-matured plan of future operations. As "master
of the situation," he could afford to go on and substantially
execute that plan, or at least the primary part of it,--the change
of base,--treating almost with contempt the enemy's bold design to
thwart him. Although this must, at least for the time being, compel
him personally to forego and leave to a subordinate the primary
operations of a military campaign,--those directly against the
opposing army,--the joint action of Sherman and Grant, each with
a powerful army, directly against Lee's army in Virginia, was the
surest and probably the shortest possible way to end the war.
Hence Sherman's broad view of the entire national military situation,
including the moral aspect of it, which was then of very great
importance, gave rise to that grand conception of far-reaching
strategy which must ever stamp its author as a master of that great
art.

Sherman having thus come to the conclusion that he personally must
abandon the attempt to "catch Hood," as he called it, his "busy
brain" did not fail to perceive every possible alternative plan of
operations. The abandonment of Georgia by Hood had completely
opened up two other alternatives, one of which was before not
possible, and the other only partly so. The one was a movement
upon Richmond or its communications to join with Grant in the
capture of Lee's army, and the other was to destroy the military
resources of the Southern Atlantic States. The first was too grand,
and perhaps might seem too visionary, to be talked about at first,
nor was any mention of it at that time necessary. Besides, events
might possibly render the march to Richmond unnecessary or
impracticable; or, possibly, Sherman might be compelled for some
reason to make his new base at Pensacola or Mobile, though he was
determined to make it at Savannah, if possible; and hence it was
necessary to have, in reserve as it were, a sufficient logical
reason for the preliminary operation, if that finally had to stand
alone.

Again, that part of the original plan which contemplated the capture
of Savannah in advance could n