airs should remain as now in Tennessee,
I propose to begin the movement which I have hitherto fully described
. . ." To which despatch General Grant replied: ". . . I see no
present reason for changing your plan. . . ."

General Grant does not refer to the later despatches in his general
report, July 22, 1865, quoted in his "Memoirs," but uses the
following language:

"With the troops thus left at his disposal, there was little doubt
that General Thomas could hold the line of the Tennessee, or, in
the event Hood should force it, would be able to concentrate and
beat him in battle. It was therefore readily consented to that
Sherman should start for the sea-coast."

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GRANT AND SHERMAN

General Sherman also omits to make any reference in his "Memoirs"
to the despatches respecting a possible long siege of Nashville,
Chattanooga, and Decatur; but he says in a despatch of November 2
to Grant, quoted in his "Memoirs":

"If I turn back, the whole effect of my campaign will be lost. By
my movements I have thrown Beauregard [Hood] well to the west, and
Thomas will have ample time and sufficient troops to hold him until
the reinforcements from Missouri reach him. We have now ample
supplies at Chattanooga and Atlanta, and can stand a month's
interruption to our communications. I do not believe the Confederate
army can reach our railroad lines except by cavalry raids, and
Wilson will have cavalry enough to checkmate them. I am clearly
of opinion that the best results will follow my contemplated movement
through Georgia."

The following language is found in a despatch dated November 11,
midnight, from Sherman to Thomas, which is especially important as
giving the last expression of his views of the situation, and of
what Thomas would be able to do after Sherman started for the sea:

"I can hardly believe that Beauregard would attempt to work against
Nashville from Corinth as a base at this stage of the war, but all
information seems to point that way. If he does, you will whip
him out of his boots; but I rather think you will find commotion
in his camp in a day or two. Last night we burned Rome, and in
two or more days will burn Atlanta; and he must discover that I am
not retreating, but, on the contrary, fighting for the very heart
of Georgia. . . . These [some Confederate movements about Rome and
Atlanta] also seem to indicate that Beauregard expects me to r