small a force as possible with Thomas, and even in starting on
his march before Thomas was fully ready to meet Hood. For to make
his demonstration early enough and as convincing as possible to
the people of the South and all the world, it was important to move
at once, and to show that his march was not a mere rapid _raid_,
but a deliberate march of a formidable army capable of crushing
anything that might get in its way, and that without waiting for
anything that might occur in its rear. Such a march of such an
army might well have been sufficient to convince everybody that
the United States had the military power to crush the rebellion,
and even destroy everything in the South, before the world should
find out that the resources of the government had been exhausted,
and that the United States had not the financial strength necessary
to make any further military use of the million of men they then
had on the muster- and pay-rolls. To have given the still more
convincing proof of the power of the Union, by destroying one of
the Confederate armies, would have taken a longer time.

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GRANT AND SHERMAN

The following despatches fully show Sherman's first plan, assented
to by Grant, the essential feature of which was that Thomas should
be able to "hold the line of the Tennessee firmly," and the
corresponding information and instructions to Thomas:

"Sherman to Grant
"Cartersville, Ga., October 10, 1864, 12 M.
". . . Hood is now crossing the Coosa, twelve miles below Rome,
bound west. If he passes over to the Mobile and Ohio road, had I
not better execute the plan of my letter sent by Colonel Porter,
and leave General Thomas with the troops now in Tennessee to defend
the State? He will have an ample force when the reinforcements
ordered reach Nashville."

"Grant to Sherman
"City Point, Va., October 11, 1864, 11 A. M.
"Your despatch received. Does it not look as if Hood was going to
attempt the invasion of middle Tennessee? . . . If he does this,
he ought to be met and prevented from getting north of the Tennessee
River. If you were to cut loose, I do not believe you would meet
Hood's army. . . . Hood would probably strike for Nashville, thinking
by going north he could inflict greater damage upon us than we
could upon the rebels by going south. If there is any way of
getting at Hood's army, I would prefer that, but I must trust to
your own judgmen