go to feeding,
as if nothing unusual had happened, or else march off to seek some
less formidable foe. Neither utters a note of defiance until he
is well beyond the other's reach.

The correspondence between Grant and Sherman, especially the letters
from Grant of September 12, and from Sherman of September 20, both
carried by Grant's staff officer, Colonel Horace Porter, show a
complete understanding of the situation at that time, and perfect
accord in respect to the operations appropriate to that situation.( 2)
Savannah was to be captured, if practicable, by military and naval
forces from the east, and Sherman was so to manoeuver in respect
to Hood's army as to swing round the latter and thus place himself
in position to open communication with Savannah as his new base.
This was the simple, logical plan dictated by the situation, which
had for a long time been considered and worked out after weighing
all the advantages and disadvantages of other possible plans.

But very soon after Sherman despatched his letter of September 20
by Colonel Porter, Hood commenced his movement to Sherman's rear,
and then far to the west, which was designed to and did radically
change the military situation in view of which the carefully matured
plan described in Sherman's letter of September 20 had been formed.
Sherman, as clearly appears from his despatches later than September
20, considered long and apparently with great doubt what change
ought to be made in his own plans in consequence of the altered
situation due to the unexpected movements of his enterprising
adversary. That some very important change in Sherman's plans was
imperative was a matter of course. A general cannot well make his
own plans entirely upon his own theory as to what his enemy will
or ought to do, but must be governed in some measure by what the
other actually does. General Sherman evidently perceived quite
clearly what established rules of action required to be done, and
General Grant even more clearly, as was shown in his despatches of
October 11, 1864, and others.

THE MILITARY THEORY ON WHICH IT WAS BASED

It seems hardly possible to speak seriously of many of the reasons
given by Sherman for finally deciding to leave his old adversary
to the care of Thomas's inferior force. He said, for instance, in
his despatch to Grant of November 2: "If I could hope to overhaul
Hood, I would turn against him with my whole forc