ent to the
west. In his "Memoirs,"( 6) Sherman says: "At first I thought of
interposing my whole army in the Chattooga Valley, so as to prevent
Hood's escape south. . . . He would be likely to retreat eastward
by Spring Place, which I did not want him to do." Even thus early
in the game Sherman saw the opportunity Hood was probably going to
give him to make his projected change of base to Savannah, and
hence he took care not to prevent Hood from completing his "co-
operative" movement.

Sherman determined to destroy Atlanta and his railroad back to
Chattanooga, abandon entirely his former base of operations and
line of supply, and assume a new base of future operations on the
Atlantic or the gulf. In other words, Sherman decided that he
could not attempt to hold any part of the territory he had conquered
in the Atlanta campaign; that conquest was valuable only in the
opportunity it gave him to destroy everything of military importance
in that territory--that is, Atlanta and the railroads. The question
then arises, What possible difference could it make in which
direction he moved after having decided not to hold any part of
that territory, but to destroy it? Why would a move toward the
west any more than a move toward the east have the appearance of
losing all that had been gained, after he had destroyed it? The
simple fact is, the Confederate commander had abandoned Georgia to
its fate in the vain hope of putting Sherman on the defensive, not
realizing, apparently, that Sherman had ample force for defensive
purposes, besides an army superior to Hood's for aggressive
operations. The Southern army was thus placed where Sherman could
operate against it by a much shorter line, and hence with a much
larger force, if that was what he wished to do. He could at the
same time, if he thought it necessary or desirable, inflict upon
Georgia the destruction which the Confederate commander wanted to
prevent, but had in fact invited by abandoning that State, and that
without materially impairing the strength of his (Sherman's) main
army operating against the main force of the enemy. As suggested
by Grant, a cavalry raid through Georgia would have accomplished
that destruction as well as a march of 60,000 men. Hence, in the
light of all that appears in the records up to the time when Sherman
actually started on his march, no valid military reason had been
given why Sherman should not have sent a cavalry raid into Georgia,