next? It was evident the army could not go much farther and rely
upon its present line of supply, although General Thomas said,
immediately after the capture of Atlanta, that he had "a plan for
the capture of Macon" which he would like to execute. What the
plan was he did not divulge, General Sherman turning the conversation
in another direction. At that time it was presumed Hood would
oppose whatever move was attempted, and hence a new base, to be
provided in advance, if practicable, by the capture of some place
on the gulf or on the Atlantic, was evidently essential to further
operations in Georgia. This new base being provided, Sherman could
move out from Atlanta with twenty or thirty days' supplies in
wagons, and swing round Hood so as to place his rear toward the
new base and open communication therewith. Evidently the march to
the sea, as it was actually made, was impossible, and was not
thought of until Hood moved from Sherman's front and cleared the
way.

In the popular judgment formed immediately after important events,
success or failure is the only criterion of wisdom; but the historian
must go deeper, and consider the merits of a general plan in view
of the greater or less probability of failure of any one of its
parts. What would have been the just judgment of mankind upon
Sherman's march to the sea if Thomas had failed, as Sherman with
a much larger force had done, to destroy or seriously cripple Hood's
army? Or what, if Hood had succeeded in his projected invasion of
Kentucky--an event much less improbable than many that have actually
occurred in war? If Hood had succeeded in overwhelming the smaller
force that opposed him at Columbia, Spring Hill, and Franklin, as
he came near doing, Nashville would have fallen an easy prey, for
it was not defensible by any force Thomas then had there. Thomas's
cavalry was not yet remounted, and Forrest, with his troopers,
would have had nearly a clear field of Kentucky while Hood marched
to the Ohio. What offset to this would have been the capture of
Savannah as a "Christmas gift" to the nation?

The situation at that time was certainly a perplexing one to Sherman.
He could not permit Hood to put him, with his superior force, on
the defensive, nor even to appear to do so for a moment; and it
was not easy for him to consent that his enemy should entirely
nullify all his elaborately considered plans for future operations
in Georgia. What operations Sherman