lay of only a few days could not have been
of serious consequence in respect to Sherman's plans. The near
approach of winter was the only reason why an early start was
important; and that was not considered any very serious obstacle
to the operations of Hood or Thomas in a more unfavorable country
for winter operations.

The railroad was in running order to Atlanta, and the enemy's
cavalry were then known to be far from it. Sherman could have kept
his army supplied, and ready to start any day he pleased. Why not
have waited to see whether Thomas could get together troops enough
to cope with Hood, and then, when sufficient preparation had been
assured to fight the enemy, and only then, start off on a march
where there was no considerable enemy to fight?

In the estimate of time, Sherman had no right to disregard even
Thomas's well-known "slowness of thought and action," but was bound
to take that into account.

I have never yet been able to see the wisdom of taking any hazard
of defeat in Tennessee when we had ample force at command to secure
victory there, with enough remaining to march wherever its commander
pleased through the South, except where Hood's or Lee's army might
be. By this I mean to say that three, or even two, of Sherman's
corps could have gone to Savannah, or anywhere else, just as well
as four, and thus have left Thomas force enough to make the defeat
of Hood sure beyond contingency; or that Sherman should have delayed
his march to the sea until Thomas had concentrated troops enough
to defeat Hood.

THE MILITARY THEORY ON WHICH IT WAS BASED

The question which now presents itself for critical consideration
is, Upon what military theory was Sherman's "march to the sea"
based?

Sherman himself explains it as a change of base, and he estimates
its value in comparison with that of his subsequent operations in
the ratio of one to ten. But why those subsequent operations, or
a change of base with a view to any such ulterior purpose? Grant
had not at that time even suggested the need of Sherman's aid
against Lee, and events proved that no such need existed. When
Sherman started for Savannah from Atlanta, the Confederate force
in the Gulf States was quite equal to Lee's army in Virginia, while
Grant's army was larger than Sherman's. Could Sherman have
contemplated at that time such a thing as going to Grant's assistance,
where he was not needed, and leaving Hoo