nt
of overcoming an obstacle due to the nature of our senses. But, this
obstacle overcome, philosophical reflection forces upon us another.
The thing which we distinguish in our ordinary consciousness from its
appearances is, after all, only another appearance; and although the
physical problem is solved concerning its accordance with our special
senses, there remains the philosophical problem as to whether this
appearance need correspond to what in the end is the real thing, viz.
that which exists in itself and apart from all perception. The only
possible answer is that it need not. We therefore can only know
appearances and not reality; in other words, we cannot have knowledge
proper. At the same time, our knowledge of appearances is objective to
the extent that the appearances in question are the same for every
one, and for us on various occasions; for the effects due to special
positions of our senses have been removed. If, therefore, we return to
the physical distinction, we see that the 'things' to which it refers
are only a special kind of appearance, viz. that which is the same for
every one, and for us at all times. The physical distinction, then,
being a distinction between one kind of appearance and another, falls
within 'phenomena' or 'appearances'.

[33] It should be noticed that the passage is, in the main,
expressed in terms of the distinction between 'things' and
'appearances', and not, as it should be, in terms of the
distinction between what things are and what things appear
or look.

Now the obvious objection to this line of thought is that the result
of the second or metaphysical application of the distinction between
reality and appearance is to destroy or annul the first or physical
application of it. To oppose the rain, i. e. the raindrops as the
thing in itself to the rainbow as a mere appearance is to imply that
the rain is not an appearance. For though what is opposed to a _mere_
appearance may still be an appearance, it cannot be called an
appearance at all if it be described as the thing in itself. If it be
only another appearance, it is the same in principle as that to which
it is opposed, and consequently cannot be opposed to it. Thus, if Kant
means by the rain, in distinction from the rainbow, the appearance
when, as we say, we see the circular raindrops, the title of this
appearance to the term thing in itself is no better than that of the
rainbow; it is, in fact, i