form--may be illustrated by the difference between the
judgements 'Chess is the _most trying of games_' and '_Chess_ is the
most trying of games'. In the former case 'chess' is the logical
subject, in the latter case it is the logical predicate. Now this
distinction clearly does not reside in or belong to the reality about
which we judge; it relates solely to the order of our approach in
thought to various parts of its nature. For, to take the case of the
former judgement, in calling 'chess' its subject, and 'most trying of
games' its predicate, we are asserting that in this judgement we begin
by apprehending the reality of which we are thinking as chess, and
come to apprehend it as the most trying of games. In other words, the
distinction relates solely to the order of our apprehension, and not
to anything in the thing apprehended.
In view of the preceding, it is possible to make clear the nature of
certain mistakes on Kant's part. In the first place, space, and time
also, so far as we are thinking of the world, and not of our
apprehension of it, as undergoing a temporal process, are essentially
characteristics not of perception but of the reality perceived, and
Kant, in treating space, and time, so regarded, as forms of
perception, is really transferring to the perceiving subject that
which in the whole fact 'perception of an object' or 'object
perceived' belongs to the object.
Again, if we go on to ask how Kant manages to avoid drawing the
conclusion proper to this transference, viz. that space and time are
not characteristics of any realities at all, but belong solely to the
process by which we come to apprehend them, we see that he does so
because, in effect, he contravenes both the characteristics of
perception referred to. For, in the first place, although in
conformity with his theory he almost always _speaks_ of space and time
in terms of perception,[9] he consistently _treats_ them as features
of the reality perceived, i. e. of phenomena. Thus in arguing that
space and time belong not to the understanding but to the sensibility,
although he uniformly speaks of them as perceptions, his argument
implies that they are objects of perception; for its aim, properly
stated, is to show that space and time are not objects of thought but
objects of perception. Consequently, in his treatment of space and
time, he refers to what are both to him and in fact objects of
perception in terms of perception, and thereby cont
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