esis of apprehension (which is
empirical) to a transcendental unity, and first makes possible its
connexion according to rules."
[55] Kant seems here and elsewhere to use the phrase
'transcendental unity of apperception' as synonymous with
'transcendental apperception', the reason, presumably, being
that transcendental apperception is a unity.
The argument seems indisputably to be as follows: 'The mind is
necessarily able to be aware of its own identity throughout its
manifold representations. To be aware of this, it must be aware of the
identity of the activity by which it combines the manifold of
representations into a systematic whole. Therefore it must be capable
of combining, and of being conscious of its activity in combining, all
phenomena which can be its representations into such a whole. But
this process, from the point of view of the representations combined,
is the process by which they become related to an object and so enter
into knowledge. Therefore, since we are capable of being conscious of
our identity with respect to all phenomena which can be our
representations, the process of combination and consciousness of
combination which constitutes knowledge must be possible with respect
to them.' Thus the thought of this and the preceding paragraph seems
to involve a circle. First the possibility of self-consciousness is
deduced from the possibility of knowledge, and then the possibility of
knowledge is deduced from the possibility of self-consciousness.
An issue therefore arises, the importance of which can be seen by
reference to the final aim of the 'deduction', viz. the vindication of
the categories. The categories are 'fundamental conceptions which
enable us to think objects in general[56] for phenomena'[57]; in other
words, they are the principles of the synthesis by which the manifold
of sense becomes related to an object. Hence, if this be granted, the
proof that the categories are applicable to objects consists in
showing that the manifold can be subjected to this synthesis. The
question therefore arises whether Kant's real starting-point for
establishing the possibility of this synthesis and therefore the
applicability of the categories, is to be found in the possibility
of knowledge, or in the possibility of self-consciousness, or in
both. In other words, does Kant start from the position that all
representations must be capable of being related to an object, or
from the pos
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