that the categories do not apply to things in themselves,
ignores the account of a conception as a principle of
synthesis, upon which the deduction turns, and returns to the
earlier account of a conception as something opposed to a
perception, i. e. as that by which an object is thought as
opposed to a perception by which an object is given.
Consequently, it argues merely that the categories, as
conceptions, are empty or without an object, unless an object
is given in perception, and that, since things in themselves
are not objects of perception, the categories are no more
applicable to things in themselves than are any other
conceptions.
CHAPTER IX
GENERAL CRITICISM OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES
The preceding account of Kant's vindication of the categories has
included much criticism. But the criticism has been as far as possible
restricted to details, and has dealt with matters of principle only so
far as has been necessary in order to follow Kant's thought. We must
now consider the position as a whole, even though this may involve
some repetition.[1] The general difficulties of the position may be
divided into two kinds, (1) difficulties involved in the working out
of the theory, even if its main principles are not questioned, and (2)
difficulties involved in accepting its main principles at all.
[1] Difficulties connected with Kant's view of
self-consciousness will be ignored, as having been
sufficiently considered.
The initial difficulty of the first kind, which naturally strikes the
reader, concerns the possibility of performing the synthesis. The mind
has certain general ways of combining the manifold, viz. the
categories. But on general grounds we should expect the mind to
possess only one mode of combining the manifold. For the character of
the manifold to be combined cannot affect the mind's power of
combination, and, if the power of the mind consists in combining, the
combining should always be of the same kind. Thus, suppose the
manifold given to the mind to be combined consisted of musical notes,
we could think of the mind's power of combination as exercised in
combining the notes by way of succession, _provided that_ this be
regarded as the only mode of combination. But if the mind were thought
also capable of combining notes by way of simultaneity, we should at
once be confronted with the insoluble problem of
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