r instance, the principles of causality can
be stated in the form 'Any known event _X_ is to _some other_ event
_Y_, whatever it be, as effect to cause'; so stated, it clearly
informs us not of the character of _Y_ but only of the fact that there
must be a _Y_, i. e. a necessary antecedent, though at the same time
this knowledge enables us to search in experience for the special
character of _Y_.
[1] The formulation of them in the first edition is slightly
different.
The principles to be established relate to the two kinds of temporal
relation apprehended in the world of nature, viz. coexistence and
succession. The _method_ of proof, which is to be gathered from the
proofs themselves rather than from Kant's general remarks[2] on the
subject, is the same in each case. Kant expressly rejects any proof
which is 'dogmatical' or 'from conceptions', e. g. any attempt to show
that the very conception of change presupposes the thought of an
identical subject of change.[3] The proof is transcendental in
character, i. e. it argues that the principle to be established is a
condition of the possibility of _apprehending_ the temporal relation
in question, e. g. that the existence of a permanent subject of change
is presupposed in any _apprehension_ of change. It assumes that we
become aware of sequences and coexistences in the world of nature by a
process which begins with a succession of mere perceptions, i. e.
perceptions which are so far not the perceptions of a sequence or of a
coexistence or indeed of anything;[4] and it seeks to show that this
process involves an appeal to one of the principles in question--the
particular principle involved depending on the temporal relation
apprehended--and consequently, that since we do apprehend this
temporal relation, which, as belonging to the world of nature, must be
distinct from any temporal relation of our perceptions, the principle
appealed to is valid.
[2] B. 218-24, M. 132-6; and B. 262-5, M. 159-61.
[3] B. 263-4, M. 160-1; B. 289, M. 174-5.
[4] This assumption is of course analogous to the assumption
which underlies the _Transcendental Deduction of the
Categories_, that knowledge begins with the successive
origination in us of isolated data of sense.
The proof of the first analogy is given somewhat differently in the
first edition, and in a passage added in the second. The earlier
version, which is a better expression of the attitude u
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