in respect of time relations from
any other, because the succession in apprehension is always of the
same kind, and so there is nothing in the phenomenon to determine the
succession, so as to render a certain sequence objectively necessary.
I could therefore not say that in the phenomenon two states follow
each other, but only that one apprehension follows on another, a fact
which is merely _subjective_ and does not determine any object, and
cannot therefore be considered as knowledge of an object (not even in
the phenomenon)."

"If therefore we experience that something happens, we always thereby
presuppose that something precedes, on which it follows according to a
rule. For otherwise, I should not say of the object, that it follows,
because the mere sequence in my apprehension, if it is not determined
by a rule in relation to something preceding, does not justify the
assumption of a sequence in the object. It is therefore always in
reference to a rule, according to which phenomena are determined in
their sequence (i. e. as they happen) by the preceding state, that I
make my subjective synthesis (of apprehension) objective, and it is
solely upon this presupposition that even the experience of something
which happens is possible."[35]

[35] B. 236-41, M. 144-6.

The meaning of the first paragraph is plain. Kant is saying that when
we reflect upon the process by which we come to apprehend the world of
nature, we can lay down two propositions. The first is that the
process is equally successive whether the object apprehended be a
succession in nature or a coexistence of bodies in space, so that the
knowledge that we have a succession of apprehensions would not by
itself enable us to decide whether the object of the apprehensions is
a sequence or not. The second proposition is that, nevertheless, there
is this difference between the succession of our apprehensions where
we apprehend a succession and where we apprehend a coexistence, that
in the former case, and in that only, the succession of our
apprehensions is irreversible or, in other words, is the expression of
a rule of order which makes it a necessary succession. So far we find
no mention of causality, i. e. of a necessity of succession in
objects, but only a necessity of succession in our apprehension of
them. So far, again, we find no contribution to the problem of
explaining how we distinguish between successive perceptions which are
the perceptions of a