_."

[33] B. 235-6, M. 143 (quoted p. 279).

"In the present case, therefore, I shall have to derive the
_subjective sequence_ of apprehension from the _objective sequence_ of
phenomena, for otherwise the former is wholly undetermined, and does
not distinguish one phenomenon from another. The former alone proves
nothing as to the connexion of the manifold in the object, for it is
wholly arbitrary. The latter, therefore [i. e. the objective sequence
of phenomena[34]], will consist in that order of the manifold of the
phenomenon, according to which the apprehension of the one (that which
happens) follows that of the other (that which precedes) _according to
a rule_. In this way alone can I be justified in saying of the
phenomenon itself, and not merely of my apprehension, that a sequence
is to be found therein, which is the same as to say that I cannot
arrange my apprehension otherwise than in just this sequence."

[34] The sense is not affected if 'the latter' be understood
to refer to the connexion of the manifold in the object.

"In conformity with such a rule, therefore, there must exist in that
which in general precedes an event the condition of a rule, according
to which this event follows always and necessarily, but I cannot
conversely go back from the event, and determine (by apprehension)
that which precedes it. For no phenomenon goes back from the
succeeding point of time to the preceding point, although it does
certainly relate to _some preceding point of time_; on the other hand,
the advance from a given time to the determinate succeeding time is
necessary. Therefore, because there certainly is something which
follows, I must relate it necessarily to something else in general,
which precedes, and upon which it follows in conformity with a rule,
that is necessarily, so that the event, as the conditioned, affords
certain indication of some condition, while this condition determines
the event."

"If we suppose that nothing precedes an event, upon which this event
must follow in conformity with a rule, all sequence of perception
would exist only in apprehension, i. e. would be merely subjective,
but it would not thereby be objectively determined which of the
perceptions must in fact be the preceding and which the succeeding
one. We should in this manner have only a play of representations,
which would not be related to any object, i. e. no phenomenon would be
distinguished through our perception